The Trump administration's flawed decision on coronavirus vaccine injury compensation: recommendations for changes.

"Professor of Law Emeritus at The George Washington University Law School, where he directed the Vaccine Injury Litigation Clinic. He served as Chairman of the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines Workgroup of the US Department of Health and Human Services, and as a Designated Reviewer of nine publications on vaccines issued by the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine. The author has no personal, financial, or academic bias or interest in the subject matter that might reasonably be expected to affect his research findings or the manuscript's content."

"50: September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §40101 note (2006) (Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization)). 51: Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 135, 159–60 (2005) (hereafter “Akerman”). 52: Kenneth R. Feinberg, 9/11 Fund: Once was Enough, Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 2008, at A17. 54: Kenneth R. Feinberg, Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Vol. 1, at 8, 10 (2004). 57: See, e.g., James C. Harris, Why the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Proves the Case for a New Zealand-Style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1367, 1372 (2006); Robert L. Rabin, September 11 Through the Prism of Victim Compensation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 464, 478 (2006) (reviewing Kenneth R. Feinberg, What Is Life Worth?: The Unprecedented Effort to Compensate the Victims of 9/11 (2005)) (‘In fact, the resultant mix of presumptive scheduling tempered by personal empathy and pecuniary adjustments at the margin was the touchstone to the success of the program.’). 58: See Matthew Diller, Tort and Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 719, 725–26, 753–60 (2003); Ackerman, supra note 51 at 138-39. 65: The judicial review provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, provides: The reviewing court shall— (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence...."